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ABSTRACT
Fundamental tax reform is examined in a heterogeneous overlapping-generations (OLG) model in
which agents face idiosyncratic earnings shocks and uncertain life spans. Following Auerbach and
Kotlikoff (1987), a Lump-Sum Redistribution Authority is used to rigorously examine efficiency
gains over the transition path. A progressive income tax is replaced with a flat consumption tax (for
example, a value-added tax or a national retail sales tax). If shocks are insurable (that is, no risk),
this reform improves (interim) efficiency, a result consistent with the previous literature. But if,
more realistically, shocks are uninsurable, this reform reduces efficiency, even though national
wealth and output increase over the entire transition path. This efficiency loss, in large part, stems
from reduced intragenerational risk sharing that was previously provided by the progressive tax
system.
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The potential economic beneﬁts from replacing the current income tax system with a ﬂat
(proportional) consumption tax system have generated a considerable amount of attention
in recent years. Examples of a ﬂat consumption tax include a value-added tax (VAT) in
many European nations as well as a national retail sales tax that is gaining attention in the
United States as a possible substitute tax base. Replacing the current income tax system
with a revenue-neutral ﬂat consumption tax would (i) ﬂatten tax rates, (ii) tax consumption
rather than wage and capital income, and (iii) eliminate all tax-base reductions (preferences)
contained in current law. In all likelihood, this reform would signiﬁcantly increase national
saving and output over the long run (Altig and others, 2001), a result that we conﬁrm. This
paper examines whether this reform actually improves economic efﬁciency.
Judging the economic efﬁciency of a particular policy reform has always been impor-
tant to economists, but it is important to remind ourselves why. Many different policy re-
forms can, for example, increase the welfare of people born in a long-run steady state, but
those gains might simply represent losses to intermediate generations. (Indeed, this point
has gained a considerable amount of attention in the recent debate on Social Security pri-
vatization.) If there is no economic gain after fully compensating intermediate generations
who otherwise lose from reform, then judgments over a reform must be made purely on a
philosophical ap r i o r ibasis1 or based on subjective intragenerational and intergenerational
distribution choices.2 To be sure, economists contribute in important ways to these debates,
especially on distributional issues. For example, economists have estimated the impact that
a particular tax system has on the distribution of income or wealth within generations (Auer-
bach and Hassett, 2001) or between generations (Auerbach, Gokhale, and Kotlikoff, 1994).
Economists have also derived the implied optimal tax schedules under an assumed social
welfare function that weights the utility of different people in a particular way (Mirrlees,
1971). But economists are not particularly better qualiﬁed in making philosophical or moral
1For example, the philosopher Thomas Hobbes argued that it is ap r i o r i“wrong” to tax estates on the basis
that wealth was already taxed when earned. Others have argued that it is ap r i o r i“wrong” for the government to
take money from one generation to give to another.
2Forexample,intermsofintragenerationaldistribution,thephilosopherJohnRawlsarguedthatsocialwelfare
must be judged on the basis of the utility of the worse-off person in society.
1judgments than noneconomists. Ultimately, what economists bring to the table in policy
debates is our insight about efﬁciency, interpreted here in the Pareto sense.
The point of departure of our paper is that previous analyses of fundamental tax reform
have not incorporated the intragenerational risk-sharing beneﬁts of the current progressive
income tax system. Our main ﬁnding is that this risk sharing is important for determining the
efﬁciency changes associated with tax reform, even at modest levels of risk aversion. When
idiosyncratic earnings shocks are assumed to be fully insurable so that each agent faces no
r i s k ,m o v i n gt oaﬂat consumption tax increases efﬁciency, a common result in the literature.
However, when wages are uninsurable, efﬁciency is reduced by moving to a ﬂat consumption
tax, even though national wealth and output increase over the entire transition path.3
1.1 The Ramsey Model
The simplest way to analyze the impact that a revenue-neutral tax reform has on economic
efﬁciency is with the Ramsey inﬁnite-horizon representative-agent model, which assumes
that households are Ricardian. Since, in general, efﬁciency changes are always calculated
relative to compensated changes, the presence of a single agent in the Ramsey model dra-
matically simpliﬁes these calculations. In particular, calculating efﬁciency changes does not
require redistributing resources across agents in order to compensate those who would oth-
erwise lose from reform. As a result, one can often derive the most efﬁcient long-run tax
structure analytically (see the reviews by Judd, 1999, and Auerbach and Hines, 2001). But
the Ramsey model is less suitable for capturing the intragenerational risk-sharing beneﬁts of
a progressive income tax system, which is the focus of the current paper.4
3This paper examines policy changes rather than attempting to derive optimal progressive tax schedules in
the Mirrlees tradition where a social welfare function must be assumed. However, our results on the importance
of risk sharing would also be relevant to that literature, which, thus far, has found little cause for progressive tax
schedules. Although computational considerations limit our ability to derive optimal progressive tax schedules
in our model, this extension could prove useful in the future as computers become more powerful.
4Well-known complications arise when attempting to model multiple inﬁnite-horizon agents. If agents have
identical time preferences (which, realistically, is a measure of zero), then there is an inﬁnite number of wealth
distributions compatible with a steady state. If, more realistically, agents have nonidentical time preferences,
then the wealth distribution becomes trivial (one agent owns everything). Incorporating progressive tax rates
creates additional problems.
21.2 The Stochastic OLG Model with Finite Horizons
Instead, this paper uses a calibrated overlapping-generations (OLG) life-cycle model with
uninsurable idiosyncratic earnings shocks, uncertain life spans, and elastic labor supply to
examine the efﬁciency gainsassociatedwithadoptinga revenue-neutralﬂatconsumption tax.
The multiplicity of agents, though, complicates the efﬁciency calculations since tax reform
redistributes resources across different households. To deal with this problem, we follow
the pioneering work done by Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987), who developed the ﬁrst large-
scale OLG model without uncertainty. Like theirs, our model incorporates a “Lump-Sum
Redistribution Authority” (LSRA) that calculates the overall efﬁciency gains or losses of a
policy change, by restoring the utility of the agents alive at the time of the reform to their
prereform levels through lump-sum redistributions both across and within generations. We
believe that our model is the ﬁrst large-scale stochastic OLG model to rigorously calculate
efﬁciency gains associated with a ﬁscal policy reform.
A heuristic technique for calculating efﬁciency gains that is more common in the litera-
ture simply sums welfare changes across households (discounted if across time); a policy is
then deemed to increase [decrease] efﬁciency if the net sum is positive [negative]. This latter
approach implicitly assumes that lump-sum transfers are made across households in order
to compensate the losers of policy reform with some of the gains of the winners. But this
approach fails to capture the price effects associated with these lump-sum transfers.
1.3 Progressive Consumption Taxes
Whileﬂatteningtaxratesreceivesthebulkoftheattentioninthetaxreformdebate,consumption-
based taxes can also be progressive. In particular, allowing ﬁrms to deduct their full invest-
ment expenses at the time of purchase from their tax payments (“full expensing”) would
effectively produce a consumption tax.5 This approach would also allow for some progres-
sivitythrougheitherastandarddeduction, asinthe“ﬂat tax”plan(HallandRabushka, 1995),
and/or progressive tax rates, as in the “X tax” plan (Bradford, 1986). The “ﬂat tax” and “X
tax” plans also protect housing wealth. By maintaining progressive tax rates, the “X tax,”
in particular, could increase efﬁciency in our model. Moreover, additional social safety net
5In fact, a ﬂat consumption tax produces the same outcomes as a ﬂat income tax with full expensing.
3programs could potentially substitute for insurance contained in the prereform progressive
income tax system to maintain efﬁciency along with growth effects.
The current paper, though, focuses mainly on a ﬂat consumption tax for several reasons.
First, we are more interested in understanding the risk-sharing properties of the current in-
come system than in analyzing speciﬁc reform proposals. Second, the computation require-
ments of our model are already signiﬁcant. In order to capture the differential tax treatment
of various capital items under the “ﬂat tax” and the “X tax,” we would have to include hous-
ing wealth and other types of capital under separate capital categories. While this addition
is possible in deterministic models (Fullerton and Rogers, 1993; Jorgenson and Yun, 2001),
adding housing wealth to our stochastic model would alone increase the computation time
by two orders of magnitude, requiring about three months to solve a single simulation on a
two-gigahertz Pentium IV computer. So we leave this innovation to future research. Third, a
national retail sales tax is gaining considerable attention in the United States.
Later in the paper, we do, however, consider a simple progressive consumption tax in the
form of a national sales tax with a rebate of the ﬁrst $20,000 of consumption per household.
This reform is similar to the “ﬂat tax” proposal except that we don’t protect existing housing
wealth; our version of the “ﬂat tax,” therefore, creates more potential for efﬁciency gains.
1.4 Outline
The outline of our paper is as follows. Section 2 gives a primer on the economic factors
associated with moving to a ﬂat consumption tax using a simple two-period model. Section
3 outlines our large-scale model that we use to simulate the introduction of a revenue-neutral
ﬂat consumption tax. Section 4 summarizes the calibration of the baseline economy. Section
5 explains the Lump-Sum Redistribution Authority. Section 6 outlines a deterministic ver-
sion of our model that allows us to make comparisons with the stochastic version. Section 7
reports the results of policy experiments. Section 8 concludes. The appendix describes the
computational algorithm in detail.
42 A Primer on Tax Reform
This section uses a simple partial-equilibrium model to present a brief overview oftax reform
in an OLG economy. We ﬁrst consider tax reform in which the prereform income tax system
is linear and the economy is deterministic. We then expand the discussion to the presence
of nonlinear taxes in the prereform economy, and then ﬁnally to uncertainty in the form of
idiosyncratic wage shocks and life spans. We do not consider the effects of removing tax
preferences; this issue and others are addressed in our larger-scale model, which is presented
in the next section.
2.1 No Uncertainty, Linear Taxes
2.1.1 The Prereform Economy
Consider a simple two-period model in which agents work during the ﬁrst period and retire
in the second period. During the ﬁrst period, an agent born in time t earns pretax wages
w1,t, pays a wage tax at rate τw
t , consumes c1,t, and saves the remainder as assets, a2,t+1,
in order to afford second-period consumption. During period two at time t +1 , the agent’s
consumption, c2,t+1, is equal to a2,t+1 plus net interest paid at time t +1 , rt+1, after paying
a capital income tax at rate τr
t . The agent’s budget constraints, therefore, are as follows:
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t ) − 1. Hence, a system of linear
wage taxes, capital income taxes, and income taxes can be represented in terms of equivalent
age-indexed effective consumption tax rates, ˜ τc. (The tilde [~] superscript is used to denote
effective rates.) Both tax systems collect the same lifetime present value of taxes from each
agent and offer the same incentives.
Notice that if tax rates are stationary then ˜ τc
2 > ˜ τc
1 when τr
t+1 > 0, that is, a positive
capital income tax increases the effective consumption tax rate over the life cycle. By the
inverse-elasticityruleoftheoptimaltaxliterature, thisincreasingtaxrateisapotentialsource
of inefﬁciency unless the price elasticity of second-period consumption is lower relative to
ﬁrst-period consumption, a result that is not an implication of most speciﬁcations of house-
hold preferences. A key motivation for tax reform, as discussed below, is to remove this
potential distortion.
Government revenue each period ﬁnances a ﬁxed level of spending, ¯ G:
τw
t w1,t + τr
t rta2,t = ¯ G,( 3 )
where the population size is assumed to be stationary.6
2.1.2 Postreform Economy: A Revenue-Neutral Consumption Tax
Now suppose that the government introduces a consumption tax, τc
t ,a tt i m et to replace the
income tax. The private budget constraints become
(1 + τc
















The government’s budget constraint equals
τc
t (c1,t + c2,t)= ¯ G.
6Equation (3) could also be represented in terms of the effective consumption tax rates shown above. How-
ever, when analyzing a tax reform, which changes the present value of taxes paid by each generation, equation (3)
is needed in its current form because second-period agents alive at the reform did not actually face the effective
consumption tax ˜ τ
c
1 during their ﬁrst period of life.
62.1.3 Primary Tax Effects of Adopting a Revenue-Neutral Consumption Tax
When the prereform tax system is linear, the adoption a revenue-neutral consumption tax can
be decomposed into two sequential steps:
i. Replace the linear income tax with a linear wage tax, thereby removing the tax on
capital income.
ii. Replace this new linear wage tax with a consumption tax, thereby imposing a lump-
sum tax on existing assets.
Since we regard the second step as occurring immediately after the ﬁrst step, the age-
asset proﬁle in the prereform economy is the one that is relevant for determining the impact
of the lump-sum tax on existing assets.7
i) Removing the Tax on Capital Income. Comparing equations (1) and (4), notice that
this tax reform generates uniform consumption tax rates across the life cycle in a station-
ary economy since capital income is no longer taxed. As a result, the intertemporal price
distortion is removed, encouraging saving. If labor supply were also elastic, an increase in
after-tax interest rates would encourage more labor supply and saving earlier in the life cycle
since asset values would accumulate more quickly.
However, this good news does not come for free. The assets that have already been ac-
cumulated by generation (t − 1)a tt i m et, which would have been taxed under the original
income tax, will not be taxed after the reform. So generation (t − 1) receives a lump-sum
transfer (negative tax) equal to τr
t rta2,t, which must be paid by future workers in the form of
wage taxes in order to make up the lost revenue.8 Moreover, because the wage base is smaller
than the income base, tax rates increase. Since tax distortion increases with the square of the
tax rate, a smaller tax base will produce more distortions. In the ﬁnite-horizons OLG model,
7In static models with one or two periods (and no bequests), one could alternatively distinguish between the
tax reform’s “substitution effect” and “income effect.” However, this distinction is substantially more cumber-
some in a model with more than two periods where some agents have accumulated wealth by the time of the
reform and will also live for more than one additional period after the reform. See Gravelle (2002) for a detailed
critique of intertemporal models.
8Our simple two-period model, though, somewhat exaggerates this point by taxing capital income only at the
beginning of the second period. With multiple periods, asset holders will have already paid some taxes on capital
income before the tax reform.
7these new distortions could, in theory, outweigh the gains associated with removing the in-
tertemporal price distortion. In fact, in their simulation analysis using a multiple-period
deterministic model with elastic labor supply, Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) ﬁnd that re-
placing a linear income tax with a linear wage tax reduces long-run output and welfare.9
ii)ImposingaLump-SumTaxonExistingWealth. AsdemonstratedbySummers(1981),
adopting a consumption tax also imposes a lump-sum tax on older people. In particular, the
consumption by generation (t − 1) in their second period of life is inelastic at time t since
their consumption is based on previous saving. Hence, when the government changes the
tax system at time t, these agents face a lump-sum tax equal to τc
t c2,t, which, under revenue
neutrality, accrues as reduced taxes paid by future workers.10
In fact, the lump-sum tax on generation (t − 1) accrues as a reduced tax liability to all
future generations. To demonstrate this fact, suppose that agents only consume during the
second period of their lives (that is, c1,t =0 ) and taxes on interest are zero (τr =0 )s ot h a t
onlywagesaretaxed.11 Undertheseassumptions, wageandconsumptiontaxesarelumpsum
for all generations, allowing for easy illustration. Now suppose that the government switches
tax bases from wages to consumption at time t. Generation (t − 1), which is in their second
period of life when the tax reform occurs, is charged a wealth levy equal to ¯ G.C l e a r l y ,t h e y
are worse off – they paid ¯ G during their ﬁrst period of life under the previous wage tax,
and now they must pay it again during their second period under the new consumption tax.
Now consider generation t, which is in their ﬁrst period of life when taxes are reformed.
Under the former wage tax, generation t would have paid ¯ G during their ﬁrst period of life.







,o rr ¯ G/(1 + r). Similarly, every future generation s (s>t ) receives a
present-value reduction in their tax liability equal to r ¯ G/(1 + r), calculated with respect to
their generation index, s. The present value sum of tax saving across all future generations,




(1+r)i = ¯ G. In other words, the present value
9In contrast, the optimal long-run tax rate on capital income is zero in the Ramsey model.
10As noted in the previous section, a ﬂat consumption tax produces the same outcomes as a ﬂat income tax
with full expensing. Under expensing, the lump-sum tax on existing wealth takes the form of a fall in Tobin’s q,
as old capital becomes less valuable relative to new capital.
11See also Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987, pp. 58 - 59).
8of the tax reduction to future generations exactly equals the loss to the initial elderly.
This intergenerational transfer has a very powerful impact on long-run output and wel-
fare. Auerbach and Kotlikoff ﬁnd that replacing a linear income tax with a ﬂat consumption
tax increases long-run output and welfare. Why are the results so different in the AK model
relative to the wage tax base discussed above? The reason is the wealth levy on the existing
capital held by generation (t − 1) that occurs with a consumption tax but not with a wage
tax; in fact, this wealth levy is the only difference between those two tax bases. In the case of
a consumption tax, this wealth levy extracts enough resources to reduce future tax burdens,
producing a long-run gain. In fact, over 100 percent of the long-run gain in the AK model
stems from this wealth levy (Engen, Gravelle, and Smetters, 1997).
2.1.4 Total Efﬁciency Gains
It is important, though, to distinguish between redistribution and efﬁciency. In the previous
two-period example, replacing the linear wage tax with a consumption tax would produce a
sizable long-run increase in the capital stock and output. But this entire gain comes off the
backs of generation (t − 1). In other words, if generation (t − 1) were to receive a lump-sum
rebate equal to ¯ G so that its utility is held ﬁxed, future generations would no longer beneﬁt
from tax reform. Hence, the efﬁciency gain is exactly zero despite the large long-run gains.
Recall, though, two key assumptions that we made: (i) agents lived for only two periods, and
(ii) all taxes were effectively lump-sum for all generations. Not surprisingly, therefore, tax
reform produces zero efﬁciency gains.
In a more realistic setting with more than two periods and with consumption in each pe-
riod, replacinga linearincome taxwith aconsumptiontaxwouldprobablyproduceefﬁciency
gains. To be sure, removing the tax on capital income alone has an unclear impact on efﬁ-
ciency since the beneﬁt from removing the intertemporal price distortion must be balanced
against the higher tax rate. However, the lump-sum tax on existing assets is likely to lead
to sizable efﬁciency gains inside a multiperiod model. The reason is that, after controlling
for intergenerational redistribution, agents with assets who are alive at the time of the reform
beneﬁt from replacing some of their own future distorting taxes with the lump-sum taxes that
9they pay today in the form of a wealth levy.12 Accounting for these different effects requires
simulation analysis. Auerbach and Kotlikoff ﬁnd that efﬁciency is increased by replacing
a linear income tax with a linear consumption tax in a deterministic framework. Within
the Ramsey model, many previous papers have also found positive gains from adopting a
consumption tax (see the review in Stokey and Rebelo, 1995).
2.2 No Uncertainty, Nonlinear Taxes
2.2.1 Prereform Economy
With nonlinear tax rates in the prereform economy, the agent’s budget constraints are
c1,t + a2,t+1 = w1,t − Tw
t (w1,t),
c2,t+1 =( 1+rt+1)a2,t+1 − Tr
t+1 (rt+1a2,t+1),
where the T (·) functions represent total taxes paid. The average wage tax rate equals
Tw





t+1 (rt+1a2,t+1)/∂ (rt+1a2,t+1), respectively.
With a stationary population size, the government’s budget constraint is
Tw
t (w1,t)+Tr
t+1 (rt+1a2,t+1)= ¯ G.
2.2.2 Primary Tax Effects of Adopting a Revenue-Neutral Consumption Tax
The budget constraints in the postreform economy with a revenue-neutral proportional con-
sumption tax are the same as shown earlier. The introduction of progressive income taxes
into the prereform economy, however, alters somewhat the two steps described above, and
also adds a third step:
i. Replace the progressive income t a xw i t haprogressive wage tax, thereby removing the
tax on capital income.
12We beneﬁt e df r o mah e l p f u lc o n v e r s a t i o nw i t hA l a nA u e r b a c ho nt h i sp o i n t .
10ii. Replace this new progressive wage tax with a progressive consumption tax, thereby
imposing a lump-sum tax on existing assets.13
iii. Replace this new progressive consumption tax with a proportional consumption tax,
thereby ﬂattening tax rates.
We again think of each step as occurring immediately after the previous step.
i) Removing the Tax on Capital Income. Much of the debate about whether to adopt a
consumption tax focuses on removing distortions caused by progressive tax rates. Indeed,
progressive tax rates tend to magnify intertemporal distortions. First, even with inelastic
labor supply, saving decisions are distorted more with progressive taxes since the future
marginal tax rate that a person faces on capital income is now directly affected by their
saving decisions. Removing the tax on capital income, therefore, encourages even more
saving when the prereform income tax is progressive. Second, allowing for elastic labor
supply tends to enhance this result. Marginal income tax rates tend to peak at middle age
when labor productivity is high and after a fair amount of assets have been accumulated
for retirement. So agents tend to shift their labor supply away from high-tax years in the
middle years of life toward lower-tax years later in life. Since more labor income is now
earned later in life, less saving is needed earlier in life to smooth consumption. Removing
the tax on capital income, therefore, would eliminate those distortions, which tend to be more
signiﬁcant when the prereform income tax is progressive.
As with the linear income tax considered before, however, one must also account for
the government’s budget constraint. Increasing wage tax rates to make up lost revenue now
creates more distortions than in the linear tax case considered earlier. Distortions increase
the most if the progressive wage tax schedule is increased in a progressive manner in order to
protect the poor. But even if the additional tax burden is distributed in a proportional manner,
distortions will rise faster relative to the linear case considered earlier.
13In practice, this could be achieved with full expensing, discussed in Section 1. An equivalent progressive
VAT or sales tax could also be implemented, but would be substantially more cumbersome to administer.
11ii) Imposing a Lump-Sum Tax on Existing Wealth As noted earlier, in a multiple-period
model, the efﬁciency gains produced by a lump-sum tax on existing wealth depend on the
extent to which lump-sum taxes replace future distorting taxes of those alive at the time of the
reform. The more assets held by younger and middle-aged workers at the time of the reform,
the more likely the wealth levy produces efﬁciency gains. Whether, for a given capital-
output ratio,14 these cohorts hold a larger share of capital under progressive taxes depends
on the exact model parameters.15 Still, the efﬁciency gains associated with moving to a
consumption tax are likely to be much larger when the prereform income tax is progressive
since this tax system is more distorting, increasing the value of the substitute lump-sum tax.
iii) Flattening Tax Rates The effect of moving from a progressive consumption tax to a
ﬂat consumption tax produces two competing major effects (and a couple minor effects that
we’ll ignore). First, it removes an important price distortion across the life cycle. Specif-
ically, consumption increases over the life cycle when the interest rate exceeds the rate of
time preference.16 As a result, marginal consumption tax rates also increase over the life
cycle, similar to the pattern produced by a capital income tax considered earlier. A shift to
a proportional tax, therefore, creates a uniform tax rate on consumption, removing this in-
tertemporal distortion. Second, this reform gives many asset holders at the time of the reform
a lump-sum transfer (negative tax), reducing efﬁciency.
2.2.3 Total Efﬁciency Gains
On net, there are likely to be sizable efﬁciency gains from adopting a ﬂat consumption tax
when the original income tax system is progressive. Both Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987),
using the OLG model, as well as Jorgenson and Yun (2001), who use the Ramsey model
14When comparing across models, one should always solve for the deep parameters that generate the same
observable economy, including the capital-output ratio. In this way, you ensure that the predictions are not being
generated by different calibrations.
15Youngerworkerstendtoface lower taxratesunder aprogressivesystem, givingthemmoreresources tosave.
But they also face increasing marginal tax rates in the future as their human capital returns increase, decreasing
their incentive to save. Older people, except those who have accumulated lots of wealth, also have a few more
resources to reinvest under a progressive tax system. But the intertemporal shift in their labor supply described
earlier in the text tends to reduce their saving. Hence, the remaining share held by middle-aged workers also
depends on the parameters.
16This effect cannot happen in the inﬁnite-horizon model since the interest rate equals the time preference rate
in a steady state.
12described in Section 1, ﬁnd large efﬁciency gains. Later in this paper, we verify this result
using a deterministic version of our model introduced in Section 3.
2.3 Wage and Life-Span Uncertainty, Nonlinear Taxes
We now consider the addition of wage and life-span uncertainty into the prereform and
postreform economies. The budget constraints for the prereform economy are the same as
those shown in the previous subsection. Moreover, the budget constraints in the postreform
economy do not change either. Adding wage and life-span uncertainty also does not change
the three steps of tax reform discussed above. But the addition of uncertainty does inﬂuence
the analysis associated with each step. We consider each step in turn.
2.3.1 Primary Tax Effects of Adopting a Revenue-Neutral Consumption Tax
i) Removing the Tax on Capital Income. The addition of wage uncertainty tends to re-
duce the importance of price distortions over the life cycle. With inelastic labor supply,
agents would hedge their earnings uncertainty by saving in a precautionary manner.17 As a
result, household saving becomes less responsive to an increase in the after-tax interest rate
following a shift to a consumption tax base.18 To be sure, with elastic labor supply, the need
to save in a precautionary manner is reduced somewhat since agents can, for example, work
multiple low-paying jobs in order to replace a former higher-paying job. But since utility
is concave in leisure and the maximum leisure time is bounded, the ability to vary working
hours cannot eliminate precautionary saving altogether. As a result, saving will be less sen-
sitive to changes in the after-tax interest rate relative to the case without uncertainty. Labor
supply, which now serves as partial insurance against bad shocks, also becomes less sensitive
to changes in interest rates.
When fair annuities are not available, adding life-span uncertainty produces two com-
peting effects. On the one hand, life-span uncertainty should lead to greater precautionary
saving, which decreases the interest elasticity of saving. On the other hand, the horizon of
agents is effective “longer” since a prudent agent will plan for a time period longer than
17Precautionary saving is positive if the third derivative of the agent’s felicity function is positive, a condition
which holds in our model.
18This point was emphasized in Engen and Gale (1996) and Engen, Gravelle, and Smetters (1997).
13average. This longer time period might enhance price sensitivity somewhat.19 The pres-
ence of a Social Security system in our large-scale model (Section 3) will tend to reduce the
importance of both of those effects.
ii) Imposing a Lump-Sum Tax on Existing Wealth. While the lump-sum tax on existing
wealth following the adoption of a consumption tax has a large impact on efﬁciency, the
introduction of wage and life-span uncertainty itself produces two competing effects. On
the one hand, the asset-age proﬁle for the average person is relatively less “hump-shaped”
due to greater precautionary saving both earlier in the life cycle (mostly due to earnings
uncertainty20) and later in the life cycle (due to life-span uncertainty). As a result, for a given
capital-output ratio, the wealth levy on the young is higher, reducing their future distorting
taxes by more than without uncertainty. As noted earlier, the main source of efﬁciency gains
from imposing a lump-sum tax on existing wealth stems from replacing some of the future
distorting taxes of agents alive at the time of the reform with lump-sum taxes. The more
of a nation’s wealth that is held by the young, therefore, the larger the potential efﬁciency
gains. As a result, the introduction of uncertainty into the analysis could potentially increase
the efﬁciency gains after tax reform, provided that the share of assets that are now held by
elderly has not increased too much relative to the case without uncertainty. On the other
hand, the value of a lump-sum tax on wealth is not as large as without uncertainty due to
the reduced importance of distortions, discussed above. Simulation analysis, therefore, is
required for determining the net effect.
19The interaction of life-span uncertainty with wage uncertainty, though, complicates matters. For example,
if in the extreme, agents lived forever with certainty, we would be back in the inﬁnite-horizons world where
we would want to focus on a single agent. In this case, Aiyagari (1995) demonstrates that the optimal tax
rate on capital income would actually be positive when the inﬁnitely lived agent faces uninsurable idiosyncratic
earnings shocks. Intuitively, elastic labor supply prevents the government from employing conﬁscatory wage
taxes to replicate full insurance. As a result, precautionary saving drives the interest rate below the agent’s rate
of time preference, generating too much capital in the economy relative to the modiﬁed golden rule. A positive
capital income tax brings the economy’s level of capital back to the efﬁcient level. The Aiyagari motive for a
positive capital income tax rate, though, is not present in a stochastic ﬁnite-horizon OLG model—not even as an
approximation—unless precautionary saving produces enough capital so that the economy becomes dynamically
inefﬁcient. Whereas dynamic inefﬁciency is guaranteed in Aiyagari’s model (where the actual level of capital is
compared against the modiﬁed golden rule level of capital), it is not in a ﬁnite-horizon OLG model (where the
comparison is made with the golden rule level of capital).
20Since labor supply is now partly a self-insurance mechanism, people are also less likely in the prereform
economy to take advantage of falling future marginal tax rates by postponing their labor supply, thereby gener-
ating more saving earlier in life.
14iii) Flattening Tax Rates. When uncertainty is added to the model, ﬂattening the tax rates
reduces risk sharing within generations. The reason is that the prereform progressive tax
system shares idiosyncratic earnings shocks. A switch to a ﬂat tax system reduces (but does
not eliminate21) this risk sharing, generating an increase in precautionary saving following
tax reform. Indeed, it is ambiguous ap r i o r iwhether the addition of uncertainty reduces or
increases the saving response to tax reform when the prereform tax system is progressive,
even though uncertainty reduces the saving response to changes in the after-tax interest rate.
By reducing risk sharing, ﬂattening tax rates might represent a nontrivial source of efﬁ-
ciency losses. In fact, if labor supply were completely inelastic (or perfectly observable by
the government, as with ﬁrst-best taxes) then all agents in identical states (that is, same as-
sets; samecurrent-periodwageincome; sameage; and soon)wouldwant tofullysharefuture
wage shocks. In this case, the most efﬁcient tax on consumption would be extremely pro-
gressive: consumption levels above these individuals’ expectation (that is, state-contingent
expectation) would be taxed at 100 percent while consumption below average would betaxed
at a negative rate (subsidized) so that it equaled the expected outcome.
In reality, of course, the most efﬁcient second-best progressive tax system will not fully
share all future risks. First, labor supply is obviously not completely inelastic. In essence,
agents with greater-than-expected wage realizations will distort their future labor supply in
order to partially “renege” on the previous risk-sharing “agreement.” Since this incentive
is understood ex ante, the optimal tax schedule cannot fully share risks ex post. Second,
in realistic tax systems, taxes paid by any agent in a given year depend only on the agent’s
current state and not on that agent’s state in previous years. As a result, a progressive tax
system will redistribute resources in the future across agents at different states today. With
elastic labor supply, this “extra” redistribution is a source of (interim) inefﬁciency.22
21To some extent, even a linear tax shares risks since people with higher earnings realizations pay more taxes.
But progressive taxes share those risks even more.
22In our analysis, we focus on “interim” efﬁciency, where the expected remaining lifetime utility of living
agents is calculated conditional on their current state at the time of reform, and the expected utility of future
generations is calculated conditional on the initial state into which they are “born” as independent economic
actors. If we instead measured expected utility across all possible states (the so-called “ex ante” position), our
results regarding the importance of risk sharing would only be strengthened.
152.3.2 Total Efﬁciency Gains
The remainderof this paper examines the importance of wage and life-span uncertainty when
analyzing tax reform. Since closed-form solutions are not possible in assessing these differ-
ent competing forces, we use simulation analysis to help determine the impact on efﬁciency
fromreplacing a progressive income tax system with a ﬂatconsumption tax. The nextsection
lays out the computation model that we use.
3M o d e l
The economy consists of three main sectors: heterogeneous households with elastic labor
supply; a perfectly competitive representative ﬁrm with constant-returns-to-scale production
technology; and a government with a full commitment technology.23
3.1 The Household Sector
Households are heterogeneous with respect to age i, working ability ei (measured by its
hourly wage), beginning-of-period wealth holding ai, and average historical earnings bi that
is used to determine Social Security beneﬁts. Every year, a large number (normalized to
unity) of new households of age 20 enter into the economy.24 A household of age i observes
idiosyncratic working ability shock, ei, at the beginning of each year and chooses its optimal
consumption ci, working hours hi, and end-of-period wealth holding ai+1, taking the gov-
ernment’s policy schedule and a series of factor prices and the government’s policy variables
as given.25 At the end of each year, a fraction of households die. Households are alive at
most up to 109 years old, and the mortality rate at the end of age 109 is one. Tables 1 and 2
show the main variables and functions used in the household’s problem.
23As is standard in the optimal tax literature, we assume that the government can commit to future policies,
thereby ignoring time-consistency issues.
24The population of this economy is normalized by the constant population growth rate ν.
25Because there are no aggregate shocks in the present model, the policy variables and factor prices of rational
expectation are actually ones of perfect foresight. But agents do not know their own future wages and life spans.
16Table 1: Main Variables and Functions in the Model
Individual state: si =( i,ei,a i,b i)
i ∈ I = {20,...,109} Age
ei ∈ E =[ emin,e max] Working ability (hourly wage) (a)




bi ∈ B =[ bmin,b max] Average historical earnings (AIME×12) (a)
Aggregate state: St =( xt(si),W g,t)
xt(si) Joint distribution of households (b)
Wg,t Beginning-of-period government wealth (c)
Policy schedule and rule: Ψt = {Wg,s+1,C g,s,τI,s(.),τP,s(.),τC,s,tr SS,s(.)}
∞
s=t
Wg,s+1 End-of-period government wealth (c)
Cg,s Government consumption (c)
τI,s(.) Federal income tax function (d)
τP,s(.) Payroll tax function (d)
τC,s Consumption tax rate
trSS,s(.) Social Security beneﬁt function (d)
Household decision rules: d(si,St;Ψt)=( ci(.),h i(.),a i+1(.))
ci(.) Consumption (a)
hi(.) Working hours
ai+1(.) End-of-period wealth (a)
Main parameters and other variables
β ∈ R+ Time preference (e)
φi ∈ [0,1] Survival rate at the end of age i
µ ∈ R Labor augmenting productivity growth rate
ν ∈ R Population growth rate
wt ∈ R+ Wage rate (1.0 in the baseline)
rt ∈ R Interest rate
qt ∈ R+ Bequests per surviving working-age household (a)
(a) These variables are adjusted by the steady-state (per capita) economic growth rate.
(b) The measure of households is adjusted by the steady-state population growth rate.
(c) The government’s net wealth and most aggregate variables (shown below) are adjusted by the steady-state
economic growth rate and population growth rate.
(d) The arguments of these functions are adjusted by the steady-state economic growth rate. Time invariant
tax and beneﬁt functions imply that the actual schedules are adjusted so that there is no real bracket creep
whenever the economy is on the balanced growth path.
(e) The time preference parameter is adjusted by the steady-state economic growth rate. The adjustment
depends on the speciﬁcation of the utility function.
17Table 2: Other Aggregate Variables in the Model
Wt ∈ R+ National wealth
Lt ∈ R+ Total labor supply
Kt ∈ R+ Capital stock
Yt ∈ R+ Gross national product
TI,t ∈ R Federal income tax revenue
TP,t ∈ R Federal payroll tax revenue
TC,t ∈ R Federal consumption tax revenue
TrSS,t ∈ R Total OASDI beneﬁts
Note: All aggregate variables are adjusted by the steady-state economic growth and population growth; that is,
these variables in the model stay at the same level when the economy is on the balanced growth path.
3.1.1 The Household’s Problem
Let si denote the individual state vector of an age i household, let St denote the aggregate
state vector at the beginning of year t,a n dl e tΨt denote the series of government policy
rules known at the beginning of year t,
si =( i,ei,a i,b i), (5)
St =( xt (.),W g,t), (6)
Ψt = {Wg,s+1,C g,s,τI,s(.),τP,s(.),τC,s,tr SS,s(.)}
∞
s=t . (7)
Then, the value function of a household is
v(si,St;Ψt)= m a x
ci,hi,ai+1





{wteihi +( 1+rt)ai − τI,t(wteihi,r tai,tr SS,t(i,bi)) (9)
−τP,t(wteihi)+trSS,t(i,bi) − (1 + τC,t)ci} ≥ amin,
and a20 =0 ,a 110 ≥ 0.26
26Alternatively, we can use Ψt for Ψt+1 on the right-hand side of the objective function because Ψt includes
the information of Ψt+1.
18Let πi,i+1 (ei+1 |ei) be the conditional probability for the age i+1working ability being




v(si+1,St+1;Ψt+1)πi,i+1 (ei+1 |ei)dei+1. (10)
At the beginning of the next period, the individual state, the aggregate state, and the
government policy rules become
si+1 =( i +1 ,e i+1,a i+1 + qt,b i+1) with πi,i+1 (ei+1 |ei), (11)
St+1 =( xt+1 (.),W g,t+1), (12)
Ψt+1 = {Wg,s+1,C g,s,τI,s(.),τP,s(.),τC,s,tr SS,s(.)}
∞
s=t+1 , (13)
where Wg,t+1 is determined by the government budget constraint. A household’s retrospec-
tive average earnings for Social Security purposes are
bi+1 =

   
   




wt−1 + min(wteihi/2,weh max
t )} if 25 ≤ i ≤ 59
(1 + µ)−1bi if i ≥ 60,
(14)
where wehmax
t is the threshold, which is $80,400 in 2001. For simplicity, we assume that the
highest 35 years of earnings correspond to those years of age between 25 and 59.28
The decision rule of an age i household in year t is a function of its individual state si,
the aggregate state St, and the government policy rules Ψt,a n di ss h o w na s
d(si,St;Ψt)={ci (si,St;Ψt),h i (si,St;Ψt),a i+1 (si,St;Ψt)}. (15)
3.2 The Measure of Households
Let xt (si) denote the measure of households, and let Xt (si) be the corresponding cumu-
lative measure. The measure of households is adjusted by the population growth rate. The
27Since ei+1 is a random variable with conditional probability distribution πi,i+1 (ei+1 |ei), si+1 =( i +
1,e i+1,a i+1,b i+1) is a random vector. Hence, ei is a realized number and si is a realized vector.
28Social Security beneﬁts in the United States are computed on the basis of the highest 35 years of earnings,
adding an additional state variable to our model. Earnings before age 60 are wage indexed, and earnings after
age 60 are price indexed. The approximation of AIME by the average historical earnings follows previous Social
Security literature, for example, Huggett and Ventura (1999) and De Nardi and others (1999).
19population of age 20 households is normalized to be unity in the baseline economy on the
balanced growth path, that is,
Z
E
dXt (20,e 20,0,0) = 1. (16)
Let 1[a=y] be an indicator function that returns 1 if a = y a n d0i fa 6= y. Then, the law of







×1[bi+1=bi+1(wteihi(si,St;Ψ),bi)] πi,i+1(ei+1 |ei)dXt (si).
For simplicity, accidental bequests due to uncertain life span are captured by the government
and distributed equally to all surviving working-age households in a lump-sum manner. The











The steady-state condition is
St+1 = St (19)
for all t and si ∈ I × E × A × B.
3.3 The Firm’s Problem
National wealth Wt is the sum of total private wealth and government net wealth Wg,t.T o t a l












ei hi(si,St;Ψt)dXt (si). (21)
There is a perfectly competitive ﬁrm in this economy. In a closed economy, the capital
stock is equal to national wealth, that is,
Kt = Wt, (22)
20and gross national product Yt is determined by constant-returns-to-scale production,
Yt = F(Kt,L t). (23)
The proﬁt-maximizing condition of the ﬁrm is
rt + δ = FK(Kt,L t), (24)
wt (1 + τ0
P,t)=FL(Kt,L t), (25)
where δ is the depreciation rate of capital and τ0
P,t is the marginal payroll tax rate.29
3.4 The Government’s Policy Rules
Government tax revenue consists of federal income tax TI,t, payroll tax for Social Security

























trSS,t(i,bi)d Xt (si). (29)





{(1 + rt)Wg,t +( TI,t + TP,t + TC,t) − TrSS,t − Cg,t}, (30)
where Cg,t is government consumption.
29U.S. payroll taxes are divided equally between ﬁrms and employees. While the incidence of the tax does
not depend on this division, our model explicitly includes the division for calibration purposes. In doing so,
we ignore the small fraction of the representative ﬁrm’s workforce whose wages exceed the payroll tax ceiling.
However, the ceiling is enforced on the worker’s share, as shown earlier.
213.5 Recursive Competitive Equilibrium
Deﬁnition Recursive Competitive Equilibrium (Steady State): Let si =( i,ei,a i,b i) be
the individual state of households and Ψ be the time-invariant government policy rules,
Ψ = {Wg,C g,τI(.),τP(.),τC,tr SS(.)}.
Factor prices (r,w); accidental bequests q; the policy variables (Wg,C g,τC,tr LS);t h e
parameters ϕ of policy functions (τI(.),τP(.),tr SS(.)); the value function of households,
v(si;Ψ);the decision rule of households,
d(si;Ψ)={ci(si;Ψ),h i(si;Ψ),a i+1(si;Ψ)};
and the measure of households, x(si), are in a steady-state recursive competitive equilibrium
if, in every period, each household solves the utility maximization problem (5) – (9)taking Ψ
as given; the ﬁrm solves the proﬁt maximization problem, and the capital and labor markets
clear, that is, (20) – (25) hold; the government policy rules satisfy (26) – (30); and, the
measure of households is constant, that is, (19) holds.
DeﬁnitionRecursiveCompetitiveEquilibrium(EquilibriumTransitionPath): Letsi =
(i,ei,a i,b i) be the individual state of households, St =( xt(si),W g,t) be the aggregate state
of the economy, and Ψt be the government policy rules known at the beginning of year t,
Ψt = {Wg,s+1,C g,s,τI,s(.),τP,s(.),τC,tr SS,s(.)}∞
s=t.
A series of factor prices, accidental bequests, the policy variables, and the parameters of
policy functions,
Ω ={rs,w s,q s,W g,s+1,C g,s,τC,s,ϕs}∞
s=t;
the value function of households,{v(si,Ss;Ψs)}∞
s=t; the decision rule of households,
{d(si,Ss;Ψs)}∞
s=t = {ci(si,Ss;Ψs),h i(si,Ss;Ψs),a i+1(si,Ss;Ψs)}∞
s=t;
and a series of the measure of households, {xs(si)}∞
s=t, are in a recursive competitive equi-
librium if, in every period s = t,...,∞, each household solves the utility maximization
22Table 3: Parameters
Time preference parameter β 0.986
Share parameter for consumption α 0.473
Coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion γ 2.0
Capital share of output θ 0.32
Depreciation rate of capital stock δ 0.046
Long-term real growth rate µ 0.018
Population growth rate ν 0.010
Total factor productivity A 0.983
problem (5) – (9) taking Ψt as given; the ﬁrm solves the proﬁt maximization problem, and
the capital and labor markets clear, that is, (20) – (25) hold; and, the government policy rules
satisfy (26) – (30).
4 Calibration
Table 3 summarizes the parameter choices. For the baseline economy on a balanced growth
path, the degree of time preference β is chosen so that the capital-output ratio is 2.8; total
factor productivity A is chosen so that the wage rate equals unity; and, the consumption share
parameter α is chosen so that the average annual working hours of married couples between
the ages of 20 and 64 are consistent with U.S. data. As explained below, a Cobb-Douglas-
CRRA utility function and a Cobb-Douglas production function are also used.30
The following sections describe the choice of functional forms and parameter values.
4.1 Households
Utility Function. Like the recent paper by Conesa and Krueger (1999) that focuses on
Social Security reform, our model has elastic labor supply. We use the following Cobb-
Douglas utility function with constant relative risk aversion (CRRA), which is compatible









30The calibration basically follows that of the four-period model in Nishiyama (2002) but extends it signiﬁ-
cantly to a 90-period setting.
23Table 4: Number of People Under 18 Years of Age in a Married Household
Age cohorts Number of people Age cohorts Number of people
under age 18 under age 18
20-24 0.895 45-49 1.011
25-29 1.149 50-54 0.445
30-34 1.617 55-59 0.188
35-39 1.905 60-64 0.094
40-44 1.649 65-plus 0.000∗
Source: Authors’ calculations using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID)
1 9 9 3F a m i l yD a t a .
∗The number 0.000 for ages 65-plus is an assumption and not from PSID data.
where γ is the coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion, ni is the number of dependent children, ζ
is the consumption adjustment parameter, and hmax
i is the maximum working hours.31 The
coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion is assumed to be 2.0. The number of dependent children
by age cohort is calculated using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) 1993 Family
Data (see Table 4). The consumption adjustment parameter is assumed to be 0.6.
The annual working hours in the model are the sum of the working hours of a husband
and a wife. The average working hours of married households between ages 20 and 64 are
3,368 hours in the 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF). The maximum working hours
are set at 8,760, which equals two persons times 12 hours times 365 days. In this calibration,
the parameter α is chosen to be 0.473 so that the average working hours of households
between age 20 and age 64 equal 3,368 hours in the steady-state baseline economy.
Working Ability. The working ability in this calibration corresponds to the hourly wage
(labor income per hour) of each household in the 1998 SCF. The average hourly wage of a
married couple (family members #1 and #2 in SCF) used for the calibration is calculated by
Hourly Wage =
Regular and Additional Salaries (#1 + #2) + Welfare or Assistance
Working Hours (#1 + #2)
.
To capture the earnings risk a household is exposed to more precisely, unemployment or
worker’s compensation, TANF, food stamps, and other forms of welfare or assistance are
added to the salaries before calculating the hourly wage. Failing to include these transfers
31In this setting, the growth-adjusted β becomes β(1 + µ)
α(1−γ), which is 0.977 in the calibration.
24Table 5: Working Abilities of a Household (in U.S. Dollars per Hour)
Percentile Age cohorts
20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49
e1 0 - 2 0 t h3 . 8 35 . 4 25 . 4 26 . 9 36 . 1 26 . 5 9
e2 20-40th 7.07 8.64 9.76 11.28 11.36 12.70
e3 40-60th 8.68 10.91 13.46 15.01 15.59 17.22
e4 60-80th 10.67 14.01 18.08 19.96 22.09 23.22
e5 80-90th 14.05 17.52 27.17 25.27 30.89 31.58
e6 90-95th 18.20 22.48 33.71 33.38 48.59 44.31
e7 95-99th 28.43 32.64 54.11 52.16 76.13 86.50
e8 99-100th 36.81 46.09 167.15 186.47 221.34 301.99
Percentile Age cohorts
50-54 55-59 60-64 65-69 70-74 75-79
e1 0 - 2 0 t h5 . 4 83 . 5 20 . 0 00 . 0 00 . 0 00 . 0 0
e2 20-40th 11.53 10.06 4.54 0.00 0.00 0.00
e3 40-60th 16.16 14.26 11.18 2.82 0.00 0.00
e4 60-80th 23.44 21.28 18.16 10.37 1.81 0.00
e5 80-90th 32.14 30.93 28.56 19.48 12.57 0.00
e6 90-95th 43.01 44.10 59.36 27.68 29.03 1.96
e7 95-99th 78.61 85.29 96.22 59.34 64.91 14.25
e8 99-100th 314.59 379.44 421.55 299.25 195.73 146.14
Source: Authors’ calculations from 1998 SCF data.
would tend to lead to an overestimate of the risk-sharing beneﬁts of the current federal in-
come tax system. Table 5 shows the eight discrete levels of working abilities of ﬁve-year
age cohorts.32 Taking a ﬁve-year moving average of these numbers, we obtain the working
ability of each age cohort. According to Bureau of Labor Statistics data, the average hourly
earnings of production workers have increased by 16.7 percent during the years from 1997
to 2001. In the calibration, the numbers in the table are multiplied by 1.167 to convert the
hourly wages in 1997 into those in 2001.
Markov Transition Matrix. The Markov transition matrix, Γ, of working ability is cal-
culated from the hourly wage of people ages 30-39 in 1991 in the PSID individual data. To
make the working ability process more persistent, the matrix is calculated as the transition
32Here, the hourlywage of ahouseholdthat worksless than 520 hours (10 hours a week per couple) is assumed
to be zero. In the real economy, some households have fairly high working ability but choose not to work (for
example, because of schooling). One observation of the age 20-24 cohort, which has an hourly wage of $193.01,
is ignored.
25from the average of years 1989 and 1990 to the average of years 1990 and 1991.
Γ =

      
          


0.7674 0.2049 0.0183 0.0045 0.0049 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.1810 0.6033 0.1844 0.0129 0.0000 0.0086 0.0046 0.0052
0.0388 0.1517 0.6768 0.1220 0.0011 0.0046 0.0050 0.0000
0.0126 0.0361 0.1039 0.7210 0.0980 0.0139 0.0145 0.0000
0.0000 0.0081 0.0332 0.2360 0.6306 0.0676 0.0145 0.0100
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0582 0.3224 0.5303 0.0891 0.0000
0.0007 0.0000 0.0000 0.0354 0.0000 0.2827 0.6433 0.0379
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3553 0.6447

      




where Γ(j,k)=π(ei+1 = ek
i+1 |ei = e
j
i).
Population Growth and Mortality. The population growth rate ν i sa s s u m e dt ob e1 . 0
percent per year. The survival rates φi at the end of age i = {20,...,109} are the weighted
average of males and females in 1998 from Social Security Administration data (2001). The
survival rates at the end of age 109 are replaced by zero.
4.2 The Firm




To compute GNP, we use the sum of working hours in efﬁciency units as total labor supply
Lt. The capital share of output θ is chosen by
θ =1−
Compensation of Employees +( 1− θ) × Proprietors’ Income
National Income + Consumption of Fixed Capital
.
Theaverageofθ in1996-1998is0.32. Theannualgrowthrateµisassumedtobe1.8percent.
The annual population growth rate ν is assumed to be 1.0 percent. Total factor productivity
A is chosen to be 0.983 so that the wage per unit of efﬁcient labor is normalized to be unity.
26Table 6: Survival Rates in the United States (Weighted Average of Males and Females)
Age Survival Age Survival Age Survival Age Survival Age Survival
Rate Rate Rate Rate Rate
20 0.999113 40 0.997978 60 0.989365 80 0.938048 100 0.676941
21 0.999066 41 0.997820 61 0.988361 81 0.931804 101 0.658846
22 0.999037 42 0.997654 62 0.987195 82 0.924980 102 0.639629
23 0.999028 43 0.997465 63 0.985840 83 0.917566 103 0.619216
24 0.999032 44 0.997267 64 0.984324 84 0.909481 104 0.597532
25 0.999043 45 0.997044 65 0.982631 85 0.900623 105 0.574495
26 0.999049 46 0.996797 66 0.980851 86 0.890904 106 0.550021
27 0.999041 47 0.996534 67 0.979101 87 0.880258 107 0.524022
28 0.999014 48 0.996258 68 0.977433 88 0.868650 108 0.496402
29 0.998970 49 0.995960 69 0.975763 89 0.856070 109 0.467066
30 0.998919 50 0.995626 70 0.973892 90 0.842518
31 0.998865 51 0.995247 71 0.971745 91 0.828007
32 0.998804 52 0.994823 72 0.969406 92 0.812554
33 0.998735 53 0.994352 73 0.966856 93 0.796181
34 0.998660 54 0.993826 74 0.964033 94 0.778913
35 0.998573 55 0.993231 75 0.960839 95 0.761457
36 0.998475 56 0.992570 76 0.957219 96 0.744011
37 0.998368 57 0.991857 77 0.953175 97 0.726790
38 0.998250 58 0.991094 78 0.948673 98 0.710031
39 0.998122 59 0.990263 79 0.943665 99 0.693980
Source: Authors’ calculations from the Social Security Bulletin: Annual Statistical Supplement
(2001). In the calibration, the survival rate at the end of age 109 is set to zero.
Fixed Capital and Private Wealth. The ﬁxed capital Kt for the calibration is obtained
by “ﬁxed reproducible tangible wealth” minus “durable goods owned by consumers” in the
Survey of Current Business (1997). In 1990-1996, ﬁxed capital accounted for 89.7 percent
of ﬁxed reproducible tangible wealth, and the capital-GDP ratio is approximately 2.8.
To connect the total private wealth with the ﬁxed capital, it is assumed that all of the
private capital is owned by households and that part of the government-owned ﬁxed capital
is effectively owned by households in the form of government bonds.
Private Wealth (Excluding Durables) = Fixed Capital
− Government-Owned Fixed Capital
+ Government Bonds Owned by Private Sector.
27In the model, ﬁxed capital is the sum of private wealth (excluding durables) and net
government wealth. Based on the data from 1990 to 1996, net government wealth in the
baseline economy is assumed to be 6.5 percent of total private wealth.





− µ − ν.
In 1997-2000, gross private domestic investment accounted for, on average, 17.5 percent
of GDP, and gross government investment (federal and state) accounted for 3.2 percent of
GDP. When the capital-output ratio is 2.8, the ratio of gross investment to ﬁxed capital is 7.4
percent. Subtracting the productivity and population growth rates, the annual depreciation
rate is assumed to be 4.6 percent.
4.3 Taxes and Transfers
Income Taxes. For the federal income tax, the model uses the following tax function in
Gouveia and Strauss (1994),
Federal Income Tax = φ0
³
y − (y−φ1 + φ2)−1/φ1
´
× φadj,
where y is the taxable income (in thousands of dollars) of a household, which includes the
taxable portion of Social Security beneﬁts. In 2001, the standard deduction for a married
household was $7,600, and the exemption was $2,900 per person. When the parameters are
φ0 =0 .41, φ1 =0 .85, φ2 =0 .015,a n dφadj =1 .0, this function replicates the statutory
income tax schedule. But because of itemized deductions, the effective tax rate of high-
income households is much lower.33 Since in 2000 the ratio of total private income tax to
nominal GDP was 0.102, φadj is assumed to be 0.604 so that income tax revenue is 10.2
percent of GDP in the steady-state equilibrium.
Inadditiontofederalincometax, a4.0percentstatetaxisassumedforincome(excluding
Social Security beneﬁts) above the same standard deduction and exemptions.
33See Gouveia and Strauss (1994) for effective federal tax rates.
28Social Security. The Social Security system in the United States shares not only longevity
risk among its participants but, due to its progressive formula, lifetime wage uncertainty as
well, which our model captures. The tax rate levied on both employers and employees for
Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) is 6.2 percent, and the tax rate for
Medicare (HI) is 1.45 percent. In 2001, employee compensation above $80,400 was not
taxable for OASDI. So, the ﬁrm’s proﬁt-maximization problem becomes
w × (1+Marginal Payroll Tax Rate) = AFL(K,L),
where the marginal payroll tax rate is 0.0765 (equal to 0.062 + 0.0145).
Social Security beneﬁts are based on each worker’s average indexed monthly earnings
(AIME), bi/12, and the replacement rate schedule in the United States. The replacement
rates are 90 percent for the ﬁrst $561, 32 percent for amounts between $561 and $3,381, and
15 percent for amounts above $3,381. Since we are not able to accommodate health shocks
in addition to our other stochastic variables, Medicare beneﬁts are constant and included
in government consumption. Since, in the policy experiments, government consumption is
held constant relative to population growth and technological change, an increase (decrease)
in Medicare tax revenue after a reform requires less (more) consumption tax revenue.
The Social Security beneﬁts received by retired workers consisted of 69 percent of to-
tal OASDI beneﬁts in December 2000.34 The calibration simply assumes that each elderly
household receives other Social Security beneﬁts—those for spouses, children, and disabled
workers—proportionally. Hence, beneﬁts are multiplied by 1.543 so that total OASDI bene-
ﬁts are equal to OASDI tax revenue in the baseline economy.
5 The Lump-Sum Redistribution Authority
In our policy experiments reported below, we measure the pure efﬁciency gains from a pol-
icy change using a Lump-Sum Redistribution Authority, following Auerbach and Kotlikoff
(1987). We extend their analysis to a stochastic OLG model with heterogeneous agents.
Suppose that a new policy is announced at the beginning of period 1. The LSRA ﬁrst
makes a lump-sum transfer (tax if negative) to each living household to bring its remaining
34The number is from Social Security Administration (2001), Table 5.A4.
29expected lifetime utility back to its level in the baseline economy. Since the welfare gain
or loss to each household depends on its own state, these lump-sum transfers (taxes)35 are
shown as trR1 (si) where si =( i,ei,a i,b i) such that
v(i,ei,a i + trR1 (si),b i,S1;Ψ1)=v(si,S0;Ψ0).
Next, the LSRA makes a lump-sum transfer (tax) to each future household (that is, each
newborn household in periods 2, 3, ...) to make it as well off in the baseline economy,
conditional on its initial state at age 20. These transfers (taxes) are shown as trR2 (s20,t)
such that, for t =2 ,3,...,
v(20,e 20,0+trR2 (s20,t),0,St;Ψt)=v(s20,S0;Ψ0).
Finally, the LSRA makes additional lump-sum transfers (taxes) to the newborn households
in periods 2, 3, ..., so that the net present value across all the LSRA transfers at the beginning
of period 1 is zero. We assume these additional transfers are uniform on a growth-adjusted








s20 {trR2 (s20,t)+trR3}xt (s20)
Qt−1
k=1 (1 + rk)
=0 .
When trR3 > 0, all of the current households would be as well off as the baseline economy
and all of the future households would be strictly better off; hence, the new policy is Pareto
improving after lump-sum redistributions. When trR3 < 0, the alternative policy is Pareto
inferior after lump-sum redistributions.
The wealth held by the LSRA (normalized by the productivity growth and population
growth), {Wa}∞









(1 + rt−1)Wa,t−1 −
P
s20 {trR2 (s20,t)+trR3}xt (s20)
(1 + µ)(1+ν)
35These lump-sum transfers are negative of the compensating variations in wealth for current households.
30Table 7: Working Abilities of a Representative Household (In U.S. Dollars per Hour)
Age Cohorts 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49
e1 9.87 12.44 17.58 18.78 21.81 23.80
Age Cohorts 50-54 55-59 60-64 65-69 70-74 75-79
e1 22.98 22.33 20.67 11.34 7.62 2.13
Source: Authors’ calculations from 1998 SCF data.
for t =3 ,4,...,∞. National wealth Wt is the sum of total private wealth, government net






ai dXt (si)+Wg,t + Wa,t,
and the government policy rule is deﬁned as
Ψt = {Wg,s+1,W a,s+1,C g,s,τI,s(.),τP,s(.),τC,tr SS,s(.)}
∞
s=t .
6 A Deterministic OLG Variant of Our Model
In order to investigate the importance of idiosyncratic wages in our policy simulations re-
ported below, we also consider a deterministic version of our OLG model in which a new
representative household is born at each date, similar to the original Auerbach and Kotlikoff
(1987) model. We assume that the working ability schedule of the representative household
is that shown in Table 7. Those numbers are the weighted average of the values shown in
Table 5. The representative household does not receive any working ability shocks, but there
is still lifetime uncertainty in order to better isolate the risk-sharing role of the prereform
progressive tax system.
Similar to the stochastic OLG economy with heterogeneous agents, the model is cali-
brated to the U.S. economy so that the capital-output ratio is 2.8 and average working hours
(per couple) of working age households (ages 20-64) are 3,368 hours. Also, the wage rate
(per efﬁciency unit of labor) is normalized to unity. The obtained parameters are as follows:




We now consider the effects of reducing the marginal income tax rates by 10 percent propor-
tionately and raising the consumption tax rate in each year to replace the lost revenue.36 We
ﬁrst analyze this policy change using the baseline model described above, and we consider
four cases: with and without wage uncertainty (life-span uncertainty is operative in all the
experiments), and, for both of these two cases, without and with the Lump-Sum Redistri-
bution Authority. We then report how the results change under some alternative model and
reform assumptions.
7.1 In the Baseline Economy
In the baseline economy, recall that the federal income tax function is
0.41 ×
³
y − (y−0.85 +0 .015)−1/0.85
´
× φadj,
and the adjustment factor φadj is set to 0.604. In our policy experiment, φadj i sl o w e r e db y1 0
percent to 0.544, thereby reducing marginal income tax rates proportionately by 10 percent.
From the government budget constraint (30), the consumption tax revenue needed to
ﬁnance the tax cut is
TC,t =( 1+µ)(1+ν)Wg,t+1 − (1 + rt)Wg,t − (TI,t + TP,t)+TrSS,t + Cg,t.







36Of course, the complexity of solving a 10 percent replacement of the current income tax system is no dif-
ferent than solving for a full replacement. A partial replacement, however, takes relatively less computer time
to solve since the transition path and ﬁnal steady state are closer to the initial steady state. The qualitative con-
clusions reported herein about whether tax reform increases or decreases efﬁciency under the different scenarios
considered below are not affected by the size of the reform.
32and a balanced budget is assumed, that is, Wg,t+1 = Wg,t, the consumption tax rate τC,t is
τC,t = {((1 + µ)(1+ν) − (1 + rt))Wg,t − (TI,t + TP,t)+TrSS,t + Cg,t}/C.
7.1.1 With Wage Uncertainty
Tables 9A - 9C show the macroeconomic and welfare results of the tax reform in the stochas-
tic version of our model with heterogeneous households. (The remaining tables are included
at the end of this paper.) We ﬁrst consider the case without the LSRA and then with it.
Without the Lump-Sum Redistribution Authority. The top panel of Table 9A shows
that GNP and national wealth increase throughout the entire rational-expectations transition
path. In the long run, national wealth, which is equal to capital stock in a closed economy,
increases by 2.9 percent from the baseline economy, labor supply increases by 0.6 percent,
and GNP increases by 1.3 percent. The interest rate decreases by 0.18 percentage points and
the wage rate increases by 0.7 percent. To keep the government wealth (debt) at the same
level as that of the baseline, the consumption tax rate increases by 1.3 percentage points.
The top panel of Table 9B shows average welfare changes faced by agents in a particular
birth cohort and the (stochastic) income class they are in at the time of the reform.37 Each
number is the population-weighted average of welfare changes across all households—with
different wealth levels and different average historical earnings—in that birth-productivity
cohort.38 All households over the age 80 in year 1, though, are in the lowest productivity
group, e1. Thenumbersareshowninunitsof$1,000andareadjusted(deﬂated)foreconomic
growth over time.39 So, for example, the table shows that the welfare increases by -3.0—that
is, an average loss of $3,000—for the household who is age 40 and in productivity class e1
in year 1, the year of reform. In words, households in that cohort would be willing to pay
a one-time fee of $3,000, on average, in order to avoid this reform.40 For households that
37In other words, the household’s prereform and postreform value functions are computed conditional on their
state at the time of reform. The household’s state variables obviously change in future years.
38Reporting welfare changes conditional on each state variable would be cumbersome. We, therefore, report
the average welfare gain within each birth cohort and income class. In the LSRA calculations reported below,
though, redistribution is conditioned on each state variable.
39In other words, a household that turns 20 in year t ≥ 1 actually gains s×(1+ µ)
t−1, where s is the amount
s h o w ni nt h et a b l ea n dµ is the per capita growth rate in the baseline economy.
40Unlike inthe Auerbach andKotlikoff model, ourreported values cannot be expressedas a share of remaining
full lifetime income since that value is stochastic in our model.
33have not yet reached the age 20 in year 1, the welfare numbers correspond to the amount of
thousand dollars (adjusted for average growth) that they gain at age 20.
Notice that most households alive at the time of the reform are worse off, except for
those in the highest two productivity classes, e7 and e8. While the gain to classes e7 and
e8 is only a small fraction of their expected remaining lifetime income, it is still interesting
that it is positive. Due to the serial correlation in productivity generated by the Markov
earnings process, the two most productive classes at the time of the reform gain from a
reduction in progressivity, and that gain outweighs the value of the lump-sum levy on their
assets produced by moving to a consumption tax. Those in lower productivity classes at the
time of the reform are, however, often worse off, including those who are only age 20 in
year 1. Evidentially, the intertemporal and labor distortions caused by the prereform income
tax system are less important to less productive agents than the risk sharing value that the
prereform progressive tax system provides.
Most future households (those younger than age 20 in year 1), however, are better off
from this reform. For example, the household who starts in productivity class e2 at age 20
in year 81 gains 1.0 (that is, $1,000), a value that has been adjusted (deﬂated) for average
growth between year 1 and year 81. Evidentially, the positive long-run general-equilibrium
effects of reform combined with the reduction in distortions outweigh the importance of the
reduction in risk sharing for them.
With the Lump-Sum Redistribution Authority. To evaluate the overall efﬁciency of this
tax change, the bottom panels of Tables 9A and 9B shows the same set of results with
the LSRA. As without the LSRA, Table 9A shows that GNP and national wealth increase
throughout the entire transition path, although the long-run gains are smaller than without
the LSRA because the LSRA now transfers resources to those who otherwise would lose
from reform in the short run. Government wealth (including the LSRA debt) declines by 2.8
percent as a percentage of GNP in the long run. Table 9B shows that households age 20 and
older at the time of the reform are no better or worse off by construction: the LSRA transfers
the exact amount of resources to hold their welfare unchanged. But all future households
34lose $3,200, a sizeable reduction in efﬁciency for this experiment.41 In other words, the
gain by future households from this reform is not enough to compensate the loss of current
households in general equilibrium.
7.1.2 Without Wage Uncertainty
In order to estimate the importance of earnings uncertainty, Tables 10A and 10B show the
results of the same tax reform within the deterministic version of our OLG economy. As
before, we ﬁrst consider the case without the LSRA and then the case with it.
Without the Lump-Sum Redistribution Authority. The top panel of Table 10A shows
that tax reform increases national wealth and GNP throughout the entire transition path. In
the long run, national wealth increases by 3.7 percent relative to the baseline economy. This
increase is larger than that in a stochastic and heterogeneous economy. While precautionary
saving increases in the stochastic version of our model as the risk sharing in the progressive
income tax system is reduced, overall saving is more responsive to changes in after-tax in-
terest rates in our deterministic model with representative households. Labor supply is also
more responsive in the deterministic model, increasing by 1.5 percent in the long run, caus-
ing GNP to increase by 2.2 percent. The consumption tax rate increases by 0.8 percentage
points in the long run.
The top panel of Table 10B shows that, without the LSRA, older households lose several
thousand dollars from the reform, in large part from the wealth levy of their accumulated
assets. Younger households, including those age 50 and below at the time of the reform,
however, gain from the reduction in distortions caused by the reform, by as much as $23,000
per household. Households born in the long run gain over $22,000, beneﬁting from both the
reduction in distortions and larger wages, although they face smaller returns to their saving.
With the Lump-Sum Redistribution Authority. The bottom panels of Tables 10A and
10B shows the results with the operative LSRA. Table 10A shows that, in contrast to the
stochastic version of our model, the presence of the LSRA now leads to a larger long-run
41Remember that these numberscorrespondtoreplacing only10percent of the progressive income tax system;
full replacement would produce even larger losses.
35increase in national wealth and output. The reason is that younger households at the time of
the reform gain more than the older households lose. Holding the remaining lifetime utility
of agents alive at the time of the reform at their baseline level, therefore, nets the LSRA a
positive level of resources in the short run.
Table 10B shows that, again, by construction of the LSRA, households alive at the time
of the reform gain $0. But future households are better off by $25,100 per household, a
remarkable difference relative to the stochastic case considered earlier where each future
household lost $3,200.
7.2 Alternative Assumptions
We now report how the results change under three alternative model and reform assumptions
using the stochastic version of our model: (i) a small open-economy; (ii) when the new
consumption tax is progressive; and, (iii) when households are even more risk averse. None
of these modiﬁcations, however, lead to positive efﬁciency gains following tax reform.
7.2.1 Small Open Economy
Tables 11A and 11B show the results of the tax change in a small open economy in which
the interest rate and the wage rate are held ﬁxed at the same levels as those in the baseline
economy. Table 11A shows that both without and with the LSRA, the long-run increase
in national wealth is larger, and the long-run increase in labor supply is smaller, than in a
closed economy (compare with Table 9A). The top panel of Table 11B shows that without the
LSRA, the average welfare loss of current households is smaller than it would be in a closed
economy (compare with Table 9B). Since the interest rate does not fall in the small open
economy after reform, some of the welfare losses by older households are mitigated. The
bottom panel of Table 11B shows that with the LSRA, the welfare loss of current households
is, again, $0 by construction, but future households lose $1,000. This loss is smaller in
magnitude than the $3,200 loss to each household in a closed economy since, in the open
economy, capital deepening no longer generates a decrease in interest rates.
367.2.2 Postreform Consumption Tax is Progressive
Tables 12A and 12B show the results of the tax change if a progressive consumption tax
is introduced instead of the proportional consumption tax considered earlier. In this case,
a ﬂat consumption tax is levied on each household’s annual consumption above $20,000.
Both without and with the LSRA, Table 12A shows that national wealth and GNP again
increase throughout the entire transition path, although by slightly smaller amounts than with
a proportional consumption tax, as shown in Table 9A. To keep the government’s wealth at
the same level as in the baseline, the consumption tax rate will have to increase by 1.9 percent
in the long run, compared with 1.3 percent in Table 9A.
Without the LSRA, Table 12B shows that, for households age 50 or over at the time of
the reform (year 1), only households in classes e1 through e3 are better off relative to the pro-
portional consumption tax. The main reason is dueto the larger revenue-neutral consumption
tax rate in the progressive system, which levies a larger lump-sum tax on those assets that
have already been accumulated at the time of the reform. The beneﬁt of this lump-sum tax
accrues mainly to future generations. Households born into income classes e1 through e6 in
the long run are generally better off.
With the LSRA, each future household loses $2,800 in welfare, which is smaller in mag-
nitude than the $3,200 loss in the proportional tax case. A key reason for the smaller loss is
that the $20,000 deduction generates a limited amount of risk sharing. However, this deduc-
tion is not as powerful of a risk-sharing device as the progressive marginal tax rate schedule
found in the prereform system. For many households, income (and, hence, consumption)
typically ﬂuctuates above the $20,000 deduction level for two reasons. First, unemployment
leads to a drawing down of previous assets in order to support a level of consumption above
the deduction. Second, unemployment insurance income (which is included in our income
measure) provides some income as well. For those households, therefore, a modest decline
in normal labor income produces only a small reduction in their average tax rates and no
reduction in their marginal tax rates under a consumption tax with a deduction.
377.2.3 Households Are More Risk Averse
Tables 13A and 13B show the results when the coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion, γ, equals
4.0 instead of 2.0. Under our choice of constant relative risk aversion utility, a larger value
of γ generates more aversion to risk as well as more precautionary saving. Interestingly,
without the LSRA, Table 13A shows that the long-run increase in national wealth after tax
reform is actually slightly larger than that shown in the benchmark model (see Table 9A).
On one hand, a smaller response might be expected since a household’s saving is now less
sensitive to changes in the after-tax interest rate for two reasons: (i) a greater share of capital
in the prereform economy is now held for precautionary reasons and (ii) the intertemporal
substitution elasticity (equal to 1/γ) is reduced. On the other hand, the risk-sharing provided
by the prereform progressive income tax system is more valuable at a higher value of risk
aversion: tax reform, therefore, generates relatively more precautionary saving in response to
thereductioninrisksharing. Indeed, theLSRAexperimentshowninTable13Bdemonstrates
that tax reform produces even larger efﬁciency losses than before, increasing from $3,200 per
future household to a loss of $5,500 per future household.
8 Concluding Remarks
Tax reform has been analyzed in numerous papers. The calculation of the actual efﬁciency
gains or losses stemming from tax reform, however, has been previously limited to mod-
els that assume an inﬁnite-horizon representative agent, making it difﬁcult to analyze the
risk-sharing beneﬁts of progressive taxation in the prereform system. This paper presents a
new ﬁnite-horizon OLG model with idiosyncratic earnings and longevity risks. Following
the deterministic OLG model developed by Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987), we construct a
Lump-Sum Redistribution Authority that is used to ﬁx the remaining lifetime expected utili-
ties of agents alive at the time of the tax reform at their prereform levels. The LSRA allows
us to report actual efﬁciency gains associated with tax reform.
Our results point to the importance of incorporating the risk-sharing aspects of the prere-
form tax system into the analysis of tax reform. With stochastic wage shocks, replacing just
10 percent of the existing progressive income tax system with a revenue-neutral proportional
38consumption tax produced a $3,200 loss to each future household under our benchmark pa-
rameter settings and model form. But when wage shocks were turned off and the model
was recalibrated to match the same initial economy, future households gained $25,100. The
qualitative nature of these results were shown to be robust to a fairly wide range of parameter
and model assumptions. A key reason for the efﬁciency loss with stochastic wages is the
reduction in risk sharing relative to the prereform progressive income tax system.
Appendix
A The Discretization of the State Space
The state of a household is si =( i,ei,a i,b i) ∈ I × E × A × B,w h e r eI = {20,...,109},
E =[ emin,e max], A =
£
amin,a max¤
,a n dB =[ bmin,b max]. To compute an equilibrium, the
state space of a household is discretized asb si ∈ I× ˆ E× ˆ A× ˆ B,w h e r e ˆ E = {e1,e 2,...,e Ne},
ˆ A = {a1,a 2,...,a Na},a n d ˆ B = {b1,b 2,...,b Nb}.
Forallthesediscretepoints, wecomputetheoptimaldecisionofhouseholds,d(b si,St;Ψt)
=( ci (.),h i (.),a i+1 (.)) ∈ (0,c max]×[0,h max
i ]×A,andthemarginalvalues, ∂
∂av(b si,St;Ψt),
given the expected factor prices and policy variables.
To ﬁnd the optimal end-of-period wealth, we use the Euler equation and bilinear inter-
polation (with respect to a and b) of marginal value functions at the beginning of the next
period. In this paper, Ne, Na,a n dNb are 8, 60, and 10, respectively. Since there are 90
different ages, the total number of discrete states is 432,000.
B A Steady-State Equilibrium
The algorithm to compute a steady-state equilibrium is as follows. Let Ψ denote the time-
invariant government policy rules Ψ =( Wg,C g,τI(.),τP(.),τC,tr SS(.)).




C), and the parameters ϕ0 of policy functions (τI(.),τP(.),tr SS(.))
if these are determined endogenously.42
42Actually, if we ﬁnd the capital-labor ratio, both r and w are calculated from the given production function
and depreciation rate.
392. Given Ω0 =( r0,w0,q0,W0
g,C0
g,τ0
C,ϕ0), ﬁnd the decision rule of a household d(b si;
Ψ,Ω0) for allb si ∈ I × ˆ E × ˆ A × ˆ B.43
(a) For age i = 109, ﬁnd the decision rule d(b s109;Ψ,Ω0). Since the survival rate
φ109 =0 , the end-of-period wealth ai+1(b s109;.)=0for all b s109. Compute
consumption and working hours (ci(b s109;.),h i(b s109;.)) and, then, the marginal
values ∂
∂av(b s109;Ψ,Ω0) for allb s109.
(b) Foragei = 108,...,20,ﬁndthedecisionruled(b si;Ψ,Ω0)and ∂
∂av(b si;Ψ,Ω0)for
allb si,u s i n g ∂
∂av(b si+1;Ψ,Ω0) recursively.
i. Set the initial guess of a0
i+1(b si;.).
ii. Given a0
i+1(b si;.), compute (ci(b si;.),h i(b si;.)). Plug these into the Euler
equation with ∂
∂av(b si+1;Ψ,Ω0).
iii. IftheEulererrorissufﬁcientlysmall,thenstop. Otherwise, updatea0
i+1(b si;.)
a n dr e t u r nt oS t e pi i .
3. Find the steady-state measure of households x(b si;Ω0) using the decision rule obtained
in Step 2. This computation is done forward from age 20 to age 109. Repeat this step




ϕ1 of policy functions.
5. Compare Ω1 =( r1,w1,q1,W1
g,C1
g,τ1
C,ϕ1) with Ω0. If the difference is sufﬁciently
small, then stop. Otherwise, update Ω0 a n dr e t u r nt oS t e p2 .
C An Equilibrium Transition Path
Let’s assume that the economy is in the initial steady state in period0, and thatthe new policy
schedule Ψ1, which was not expected in period 0, is announced at the beginning of period 1,
where Ψ1 = {Wg,t+1,C g,t,τI,t(.),τP,t(.),τC,t,tr SS,t(.)}∞
t=1. Let b S1 =( x1(b si),W g,1) be
43In the steady-state economy, the decision rule of a household d(b si;Ψ,Ω
0) is not a function of the aggregate
state of economy b S =( x(b si),W g). The measure of household x(b si) is determined uniquely by the steady-state
condition, and the government’s wealth Wg is determined by the policy rule Ψ.
40the aggregate state of the economy at the beginning of period 1. The state of the economy b S1
is usually equal to that of the initial steady state. The algorithm to compute a transition path
to a new steady-state equilibrium (thereafter, ﬁnal steady-state equilibrium) is as follows.
1. Choose a sufﬁciently large number, T, such that the economy is said to reach the
new steady state within T periods.44 Set the initial guess, {Ω0
t}T
t=1, on factor prices
(r0
t,w0
t), accidental bequests q0
t, the policy variables (W0
g,t+1,C0
g,t,τ0
C,t),a n dt h ep a -
rameters ϕ0









T), ﬁnd the ﬁnal steady-state decision
rule d(b si, b ST;ΨT;Ω0
T) and compute marginal values ∂
∂av(b si, b ST;ΨT;Ω0
T) for all
b si ∈ I × b E × b A × b B. (See the algorithm for a steady-state equilibrium.)
3. For period t = T −1,T−2,...,1, based on the guess, Ω0
t, ﬁnd backward the decision
rule d(b si, b St;Ψt;Ω0
t) and marginal values ∂
∂av(b si, b St;Ψt;Ω0
t) for all b si ∈ I × b E ×
b A × b B, using the next-period marginal values ∂
∂av(b si, b St+1;Ψt+1;Ω0
t+1) recursively.
(a) For age i =1 0 9 , ﬁnd the decision rule d(b s109, b St;Ψt;Ω0
t) and compute the
marginal values ∂
∂av(b s109, b St;Ψt;Ω0
t) for allb s109.
(b) For age i =1 0 8 ,...,20, ﬁnd the decision rule d(b si, b St;Ψt;Ω0
t) and compute
∂
∂av(b si, b St;Ψt;Ω0
t)forallb si,u si n g ∂
∂av(b si+1, b St+1;Ψt+1;Ω0
t+1)previouslycom-
puted.45
i. Set the initial guess of a0
i+1(b si;.).
ii. Given a0
i+1(b si;.), compute (ci(b si;.),h i(b si;.)). Plug these into the Euler
equation with ∂
∂av(b si+1, b St+1;Ψt+1;Ω0
t+1).
iii. IftheEulererrorissufﬁcientlysmall,thenstop. Otherwise, updatea0
i+1(b si;.)
a n dr e t u r nt oS t e pi i .









and the measure of households xt+1(b si), using the decision rule d(b si, b St;Ψt;Ω0
t) ob-
tained in Step 3 and using the state of economy b St =( xt(b si),W g,t) recursively.
44For this to be the case, the government’s policy rule has to be time-invariant sufﬁciently before period T,
that is, Ψs = ΨT for 1 ≤ s<T.
45Note that this step does not use
∂







t=1. If the difference is sufﬁciently small, then stop.
Otherwise, update {Ω0
t}T
t=1 a n dr e t u r nt oS t e p2 .( I ft h eﬁnal steady-state equilibrium
is known, return to Step 3 instead.)
D The Lump-Sum Redistribution Authority
When the Lump-Sum Redistribution Authority (LSRA) is assumed, the following computa-
tion is added to the iteration process for an equilibrium transition path.
1. [Step 1 in the previous subsection “An Equilibrium Transition Path” (hereafter ETP)]




t=1 and set the initial value.
2. [Steps 2 and 3 in ETP] For period t = T,T −1,...,2, compute the lump-sum transfers
to newborn households (age 20) trR2(b s20,t) to make those households as much better
off as the baseline economy.
(a) Settheinitialvalueoflump-sumtransferstrR2(b s20, b St;Ψt;Ωt)tonewbornhouse-
holds.
(b) Given trR2(b s20, b St;Ψt;Ωt), ﬁnd the decision rule ofnewborn householdsd(b s20,
b St;Ψt;Ωt).
(c) Find the compensating variation in wealth ∆trR2(b s20, b St;Ψt;Ωt) to make those
households indifferent from the baseline economy. (Initial wealth of newborn
householdsisassumedtobezero.) Iftheabsolutevalueof∆trR2(b s20, b St;Ψt;Ωt)
is sufﬁciently small, then go to Step (d). Otherwise, update trR2(b s20, b St;Ψt;Ωt)
by adding ∆trR2(b s20, b St;Ψt;Ωt) a n dr e t u r nt oS t e p( b ) .
(d) GiventrR2(b s20, b St;Ψt;Ωt)andadditionallump-sumtransferstonewbornstrR3,
ﬁnd the decision rule of newborn households d(b s20, b St;Ψt;Ωt).
3. [Step 3 in ETP] For period t =1 , compute the lump-sum transfers to current house-
holds (ages 20-109) trR1(b si) to make those households as much better off as the base-
line economy.
42(a) Set the initial value of lump-sum transfers trR1(b si, b S1;Ψ1;Ω1) to current house-
holds.
(b) GiventrR1(b si, b S1;Ψ1;Ω1),ﬁndthedecisionruleofcurrenthouseholdsd(b si, b S1;
Ψ1;Ω1).
(c) Find the compensating variation in wealth to make those households indifferent
from the baseline economy. Compute ∆trR1(b si, b S1;Ψ1;Ω1) as the difference
from current beginning-of-period wealth. If the absolute value of ∆trR1(b si, b S1;
Ψ1;Ω1) is sufﬁciently small, then stop. Otherwise, update trR1(b si, b S1;Ψ1;Ω1)
by adding ∆trR1(b si, b S1;Ψ1;Ω1) a n dr e t u r nt oS t e p( b ) .
4. [Before Step 4 in ETP] Compute an additional lump-sum transfer trR3 so that the
net present value of all transfers becomes zero. Compute the wealth held by LSRA,
{W1
a,t}T
t=1, which will be used to calculate national wealth.
5. [After Step 4 in ETP] RecomputetrR3 and {W1
a,t}T






t=1. If the difference is sufﬁciently small, then stop.
Otherwise, update {W0
a,t}T
t=1 a n dr e t u r nt oS t e p2 .
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